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reacts to different characteristics of government debt. We find that the fiscal sustainability 
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“In countries with fiscal space, the budget could also do more to support aggregate 
demand. Many countries lack this fiscal space and, of course, how much countries can 
do to support demand will depend on individual country circumstances.” In Act Now, Act 
Together, IMF 20161 
 
1. Introduction 
When assessing fiscal sustainability, studies traditionally use overall government debt 
without considering its composition or set of possible characteristics. In fact, several features 
of sovereign debt can provide relevant information to capital markets when pricing both new 
issuances and secondary market transactions. Moreover, the possibility that fiscal 
sustainability is also a time-varying reality is important and a scarcely an issue addressed in 
the related literature. 
Several papers have used a so-called fiscal reaction function to assess, in a forward-
looking way, if larger primary surplus today lead to a reduction in the future level of debt 
(see notably Bohn, 1998, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001, Afonso, 2008, Weichenrieder 
and Zimmer, 2014, whose evidence points to the lack of adherence to the idea that price level 
may be determined via the intertemporal government budget constraint, given that 
governments are in fact quite Ricardian). In another strand, for instance, Dell’Erba, 
Hausmann and Panizza (2013) report that debt composition matters for sovereign bond yield 
spreads, while Kim (2015) shows that long-term government debt ends up being less 
expensive than short-term debt, and it implies a higher limit for debt issuance without 
default. 
                                                          





As Ostry el al. (2010) put it, what constitutes a safe level of sovereign debt or ample 
fiscal space is very difficult to pin down precisely in practice, and can never be established 
through some mechanical rule or thresholds. We add two contributions to the literature: first, 
we compute a set of time-varying fiscal responses of the debt-to-GDP ratio to primary budget 
balances for a sample of 13 advanced countries, which we take as a measure of fiscal space; 
second, we assess how these time-varying so-called sustainability coefficients react to several 
composition features and characteristics of government debt, notably in terms of currency 
denomination, maturity, and the holders of the sovereign debt (type of lender). This is 
important since there is a strict relationship between the notion of fiscal space and 
government bond yields (spreads) which are directly linked to risk perception and features of 
financial volatility dynamics (Ribeiro et al., 2016). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the underlying 
data and empirical methodology to be used. Section 3 presents and discusses our main 
results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
Our sample covers 13 Advanced Economies with annual data between 1980 and 2012. 
The country set is: Australia, Spain, Ireland, Japan, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Italy, 
Germany, France, Belgium, UK and USA.  We begin by estimating what we call a country-
specific time-varying fiscal sustainability coefficient ( ). Therefore, we start with the 
following fiscal reaction function:  
 






where pb is the primary balance-to-GDP ratio and d is the sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio (both 
variables are retrieved from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics). Note that  is our 
coefficient of interest and it measures the country-specific sensitivity of the primary balance 
to public debt changes, which may vary over time. The magnitude of  conveys notably a 
message to investors regarding the likelihood of a certain sovereign issuer being closer of 
further away to fiscal distress, which then will have to be translated into different yield and 
CDS spreads.  denote country and time effects, respectively. Finally,  is an i.i.d. 
disturbance term satisfying standard assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. 
The coefficient  in (1) is then assumed to change slowly and unsystematically over 
time and the expected value of the coefficient at time t is equal to the value of the coefficient 
in time t-1 (i.e. we assume the coefficient to be a random walk). The change of the 
coefficient is denoted by , which is assumed to be normally distributed with expectation 
zero and variance : 
 
 .  (2) 
 
We estimate (1) and (2) jointly using the Varying-Coefficient model proposed by 
Schlicht (1985, 1988). In this approach the variances  are calculated by a method-of-
moments estimator that coincides with the maximum-likelihood estimator for large samples. 
The model described in (1) and (2) generalizes the classical linear regression model, which is 
obtained as a special case when the variance of the disturbances in the coefficients 





advantages compared to other methods to compute time-varying coefficients (TVC) such as 
rolling windows and Gaussian methods. First, it allows using all observations in the sample 
to estimate the magnitude of spillover in each year. Second, changes in the size of estimated 
TVC in a given year come from innovations in the same year, rather than from shocks 
occurring in neighbouring years.  
As a second step, we use the computed time-varying estimates  - the fiscal 
sustainability TVC which one can proxy as a measure of fiscal space - as our dependent 
variable in a regression using public debt characteristics in the right hand side. Together with 
a set of controls known to affect fiscal developments (see for instance, Afonso, 2003, and 
Golinelli and Momigliano, 2008) we look at the positive/negative effects of the several 
dimensions of government debt on the fiscal sustainability position or our measure of fiscal 
space. In particular, we estimate:                             
 
    ititittiit   '''ˆ XDC  (3) 
 
where  is our measure of fiscal space, and an indication of future possible fiscal concern, 
in country i at time t.  represents country fixed effects;  denotes time effects. The former 
captures unobserved heterogeneity across countries and time-unvarying factors such as 
geographical variables; the latter aims to control for global shocks.  itX  is a vector of control 
variables that includes real GDP growth, inflation rate, trade openness (exports plus imports 





International Financial Statistics) and an institutional quality proxy(given by the polity2 
indicator of the Polity IV project).2 Finally,  itDC  corresponds to a vector containing our set 
of public debt characteristics (see below). it  is an error term disturbance satisfying standard 
assumptions.  
Equation (3) is first estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Since the dependent 
variable in equation (3) is based on estimates, the regression residuals can be thought of as 
having two components. The first component is sampling error; the second component is the 
random shock that would have been obtained even if the dependent variable were observed 
directly as opposed to estimated. This would lead to an increase in the standard deviation of 
the estimates, lowering the t-statistics. This means that any correction to the presence of this 
unmeasurable error term will increase the significance of our estimates. To address this, 
equation (3) is estimated using Weighted Least Squares (WLS). Specifically, the weighted-
least-squares estimator assumes that the errors it  in equation (3) are distributed as 
)/,0( 2 iit sN   , where is the estimated standard deviation of the TVC coefficient in 
country i, and 2  is an unknown parameter that is estimated in the second-stage regression.  
The indicators on the composition of sovereign debt are sourced from Abbas et al. 
(2014) and cover four major dimensions: 1) currency, i.e. the share of debt issued in foreign 
currency versus local currency; 2) maturity, i.e. the share of short-term debt (with a maturity 
of less than one year or the shortest maturity of more than one year for which data are 
available at the date of issuance) versus medium- and long-term debt; 3) holders, i.e. the 
share of the debt that is held by either the central bank, the domestic commercial banks, non-






residents, or the domestic non-bank sector; and 4) marketability, i.e. the share of the debt that 
is non-marketable versus marketable. All shares are in percentage of total government debt. 
 
3. Analysis of Empirical Results 
Overall, the results of the first step of our analysis – estimating the country-specific 
TVCs – show that our  coefficient fluctuates around a median of 0.065 (Figure 1). 
Moreover, the time varying sustainability coefficient fell significantly following the Global 
Financial Crisis. This is even more evident for the individual country’s TVCs (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1: Interquartile range of Fiscal Sustainability Time-Varying Coefficient 



















Figure 2: Country-by-country time profile of Fiscal Sustainability Time-Varying 
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Source: author’s computations. 
 
We then move on to estimate our equation (3) and assess the relevance of several public 
debt characteristics in affecting our measure of fiscal space. The estimations via OLS and 
WLS are reported in Table 1 and in Table 2, respectively. 
Our set of results merit several comments. The larger the share of sovereign debt issued 
in foreign currency the higher the fiscal sustainability time-varying coefficient (and naturally 
the further away form a situation of distress that sovereign would be). The larger (smaller) 







Table 1. Ordinary Least Squares 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regressors         
Real GDP growth -0.328* -0.224 -0.201 -0.049 -0.225 -0.224 0.150 0.030 
 (0.195) (0.198) (0.201) (0.213) (0.202) (0.202) (0.227) (0.189) 
Inflation 0.334** 0.613*** 0.512*** 0.490*** 0.537*** 0.669*** 0.796*** 0.735*** 
 (0.132) (0.135) (0.141) (0.166) (0.141) (0.152) (0.152) (0.144) 
Open -0.045*** -0.033*** -0.025** -0.020 -0.022* -0.042*** -0.006 -0.052*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Budget balance 0.834*** 0.696*** 0.720*** 0.548*** 0.754*** 0.695*** 0.674*** 0.449*** 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.123) (0.134) (0.122) (0.123) (0.143) (0.127) 
Institutional quality 8.055* 8.211* 9.503** 11.039** 15.143*** 6.342 13.210*** 15.985*** 
 (4.257) (4.369) (4.411) (4.596) (5.065) (4.548) (4.913) (4.635) 
share_foreign 0.239***       0.907*** 
 (0.045)       (0.070) 
share_short  -0.083***       
  (0.027)       
share_mdlng   0.003     0.155*** 
   (0.024)     (0.024) 
share_nonres    0.010    -0.075*** 
    (0.029)    (0.029) 
share_banks     0.074**   0.034 
     (0.030)   (0.026) 
share_cb      -0.239**  -0.278*** 
      (0.102)  (0.093) 
share_mkt       0.106*** 0.235*** 
       (0.034) (0.032) 
Observations 379 379 379 344 372 372 349 328 
R-squared 0.211 0.173 0.152 0.118 0.163 0.162 0.200 0.501  
Note: Dependent variable is the TVC estimate. OLS estimation.  Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Constant 




Moreover, we also find that the larger (smaller) the share of debt held by the central 
bank (commercial banks) the smaller (higher) the fiscal sustainability TVC. In this context, 
we can bear in mind that several countries in our sample have benefited from the 
Quantitative Easing measures of the respective central banks, which allowed both additional 
demand in capital markets for those sovereign bonds, together with lower spreads. For 
instance, in the third quarter of 2012 the European Central Bank announced that it could 
conduct Outright Monetary Transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets, and other 





banks.3 Hence, a higher share of central bank holdings of sovereign debt might be perceived 
by investors with mixed feelings, regarding countries’ ability to fund themselves in the 
market. Finally, the larger the share of marketable debt the higher the fiscal sustainability 
TVC, which also would link to the fact that such sovereign debt can have a higher degree of 
liquidity in the markets. 
Table 2. Weighted Least Squares 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Regressors          
Real GDP growth -0.302* -0.167 -0.182 0.021 -0.197 -0.196 0.165 0.061 
 (0.181) (0.188) (0.188) (0.199) (0.191) (0.190) (0.206) (0.172) 
Inflation 0.559*** 0.785*** 0.628*** 0.751*** 0.779*** 0.898*** 0.958*** 1.018*** 
 (0.123) (0.133) (0.136) (0.155) (0.136) (0.145) (0.144) (0.136) 
Open -0.025** -0.007 -0.001 -0.010 0.001 -0.024* 0.015 -0.053*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Budget balance 0.862*** 0.722*** 0.769*** 0.521*** 0.763*** 0.702*** 0.643*** 0.474*** 
 (0.111) (0.115) (0.116) (0.127) (0.116) (0.117) (0.132) (0.119) 
Institutional quality 7.158* 8.707** 9.322** 8.760** 13.319*** 5.359 12.388*** 14.031*** 
 (3.885) (4.069) (4.055) (4.353) (4.833) (4.270) (4.436) (4.296) 
share_foreign 0.277***       0.861*** 
 (0.044)       (0.066) 
share_short  -0.043       
  (0.028)       
share_mdlng   -0.044*     0.118*** 
   (0.025)     (0.025) 
share_nonres    0.047*    -0.004 
    (0.029)    (0.029) 
share_banks     0.050*   0.049** 
     (0.027)   (0.024) 
share_cb      -0.250**  -0.261*** 
      (0.100)  (0.093) 
share_mkt       0.098*** 0.187*** 
       (0.033) (0.030) 
Observations 379 379 379 344 372 372 349 328 
R-squared 0.266 0.194 0.196 0.161 0.194 0.200 0.253 0.528 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the TVC estimate. WLS estimation with weights given by the inverse of the standard errors of 
the estimated TVCs. Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Constant term estimated but omitted for reasons of 
parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
As a robustness exercise, we re-run specification 8 of Table 2, excluding one country 
at the time from our main sample. The results (in the Appendix), confirm the overall findings 
                                                          
3 According to ECB (2015), the announcements of the Outright Monetary Transactions “led to sizeable changes 





that we have already reported, notably, and in addition to the main economic drivers, the 
relevance of the several sovereign debt features (foreign currency debt, shares of longer-term 
debt, of debt held by the central bank, and of marketable debt). 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have computed time-varying fiscal responses of the debt ratio to primary 
budget balances for 13 advanced economies and we assessed how countries’ fiscal space 
reacted to several characteristics of government debt. We found that the fiscal sustainability 
time-varying coefficient increases with the share of foreign currency debt, the share of 
longer-term debt, the share of debt held by the central bank, and the share of marketable debt.  
From a policy perspective it is quite relevant that fiscal sustainability would diminish 
with the increase of the share of short-term debt, a situation that tends to arise in distressed 
economies with long-term debt issuance difficulties in crisis periods, and with some sort of 
shutdown from capital markets regarding those bonds. In addition, sovereign debt held by the 
central bank seems to reduce the risks of fiscal concerns, which naturally can also be relevant 
for the monetary authorities’ policy making, who care notably also about the magnitude of 
their interventions in the sovereign bond market. 
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Table A1. Robustness: Weighted Least Squares – dropping one country at the time  
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Country dropped USA UK Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Sweden Canada Japan Ireland Spain Australia 
              
Real GDP growth 0.078 0.083 0.009 -0.005 0.055 0.010 0.091 0.256 0.063 -0.117 0.061 0.049 0.032 
 (0.180) (0.165) (0.177) (0.178) (0.183) (0.177) (0.146) (0.169) (0.185) (0.197) (0.172) (0.179) (0.178) 
Inflation 1.013*** 0.871*** 1.078*** 1.083*** 0.998*** 0.610*** 1.025*** 1.004*** 0.933*** 0.708*** 1.018*** 0.980*** 1.256*** 
 (0.144) (0.134) (0.137) (0.145) (0.141) (0.155) (0.114) (0.132) (0.155) (0.161) (0.136) (0.143) (0.144) 
Open -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.106*** -0.061*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 0.010 -0.052*** -0.025 -0.088*** -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.077*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) Budget balance 0.442*** 0.455*** 0.568*** 0.452*** 0.488*** 0.737*** 0.443*** 0.236** 0.626*** 0.526*** 0.474*** 0.504*** 0.532*** 
 (0.127) (0.114) (0.126) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.100) (0.120) (0.132) (0.128) (0.119) (0.125) (0.122) 
Institutional quality 13.607*** 10.946*** 17.641*** 16.751*** 11.929*** 13.202*** 5.933 15.267*** 20.701*** 7.609 14.031*** 16.277*** 11.958*** 
 (4.387) (4.066) (4.288) (4.880) (4.590) (4.421) (3.757) (4.056) (5.252) (4.899) (4.296) (4.761) (4.339) 
share_foreign 0.828*** 0.746*** 0.869*** 0.842*** 0.871*** 0.894*** 0.660*** 0.823*** 0.821*** 0.827*** 0.861*** 0.895***  
 (0.069) (0.064) (0.071) (0.068) (0.068) (0.064) (0.057) (0.088) (0.072) (0.067) (0.066) (0.069)  
share_mdlng 0.114*** 0.033 0.141*** 0.087*** 0.109*** 0.118*** 0.171*** 0.131*** 0.079** 0.148*** 0.118*** 0.143*** -0.860*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.063) 
share_nonres 0.009 0.112*** -0.042 0.001 -0.019 -0.024 -0.076*** 0.008 -0.016 -0.073** -0.004 0.011 0.020  (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) 
share_banks 0.036 0.114*** -0.004 0.056** 0.029 0.035 -0.048** 0.054** 0.048* 0.124*** 0.049** 0.063** 0.059** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
share_cb -0.288*** -0.063 -0.331*** -0.373*** -0.241** -0.348*** -0.345*** -0.200** -0.105 -0.184* -0.261*** -0.208** -0.281*** 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.092) (0.102) (0.096) (0.092) (0.077) (0.088) (0.108) (0.102) (0.093) (0.103) (0.107) 
share_mkt 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.251*** 0.205*** 0.189*** 0.158*** 0.155*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.234*** 0.187*** 0.173*** 0.178*** 
 (0.043) (0.029) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) 
share_short             -1.002***              (0.073) 
              
Observations 298 299 298 298 308 298 299 312 298 298 328 304 298 
R-squared 0.517 0.555 0.589 0.559 0.523 0.586 0.605 0.470 0.542 0.508 0.528 0.540 0.564 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the TVC estimate. Each regression corresponds to specification 8 in Table 2 dropping one country of the sample at the time (as indicated in the second 
row). WLS estimation with weights given by the inverse of the standard errors of the estimated TVCs. Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Constant term estimated but 
omitted for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.    
